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This research is a critique of the regional integration attempts at conflict 
management in Africa. The drive towards the establishment of an African 
peace and security mechanism has become a common topic of discourse in 
political, security, and academic circles. If Europe needs integration for 
strength and prosperity, Africa needs it for survival. There is need for a 
rethink on the African regional integration. Commitments to African regional 
integration have been constrained by a highly ambivalent critique of the 
colonial heritage of sovereignty, and unwilling to transfer any of such 
freedom to supra-national bodies (Zartman, 1995). Yet this has the potentials 
of enhancing their ability to plan, coordinate and evaluate the 
implementation of collective projects and programs. This research opine that 
to be successful, African regional and sub regional integrations need to 
embrace the concepts of good governance, sound civil-military relations and 
commitment to democracy and human rights, rather than just on military 
components of security cooperation. 
Introduction 
The end of  the cold war and  the marginalization  of  Africa,  coupled  with 
the vicious  cycle  of  poverty, underdevelopment,  disease and internecine 
conflicts  have  generally  been  cited  as the  fundamental reasons for  the 
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aggressive effort for such  architects of  regional integration  and the 
establishment of an African peace  and security  mechanism  (Aboagye, 
2007). This  concept  emanated from regionalism  which  implies  
cooperation among states  in  geographically  proximate and  delimited  areas 
for the  pursuit   of  mutual gains  in one or  more issue  areas. In most of the 
successful cases of regionalism, states that are already   partners in solid 
political processes; based on shared and complementary values, devolve 
collective   decisions, to structures that supplement, rather than supplant 
national institutions.  While  regionalism may lead  to the creation  of new  
political organizations  over time,  regionalism and state  strength are not   
supposed to stand  in  opposition  to one  another, as  states   remain  the 
essential building blocks from which such arrangement are constructed.  
Regional  integration is an association of  countries  occupying  a  particular 
geographical area  for the  safeguarding  or  promotion  of  members, and  
operate  on terms  that are fixed  by treaties, or other rules  and regulations.   
Some scholars have viewed regional integration as a worldwide phenomenon 
of territorial systems  that  increase  the  interactions between  their  
components and create  new  forms of organization,  co-existing with 
traditional forms of state  led  organization at the national  level. They  argue  
that the initiatives should  fulfill; the  strengthening of trade integration in the 
region, the  creation  of an  appropriate  enabling environment for private 
sector  development, the development of infrastructural programmes in 
support of economic   growth,  the development of strong public sector  
institutions and good  governance, the reduction of social exclusion and the 
development of an inclusive  civil  society ,  contribution  to peace and 
security  in the region , the building  of environment  programmes at the 
regional  level,  and  the strengthening  of the region’s interaction with other 
regions of the world   (Philippe and Langenhove, 2007: 377-83). 
Others  have  viewed  regional  integration as the process  by which states 
within a particular  region  increase  their level  of  interaction  with regard  to 
economic, security, political, social and cultural issues. They concluded that 
regional integration is the joining of individual states within a region into a 
larger whole. The  degree  of  integration  depends  upon  the  willingness  
and  commitment  of  independent sovereign  states  to share their 
sovereignty  (Hans and Langenhove, 2003: 1-9). 
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Generally  speaking, regional  integration involve   a  process  by which  
nations enter  into a  regional organization with a  view  to increasing  
regional  cooperation  and reduce  regional  tensions.  Past  attempts at this  
have  focused  on increasing the free  movement of people,  goods and  
services  across  national frontiers,  removing  barriers to free trade, and the  
possibility  of regional armed  conflict. Regional integration also implies the 
opening of discussion towards the enlargement of existing institutions, and 
the conclusion of inter-regional agreements. This kaleidoscopic interplay of 
institutions, identities and socio-political factors account for the 
polymorphous nature of the so called new regionalization process. Closely 
tied to the advancement of globalization, the regionalization process often   
endorsed   previously existing international economic link between 
neighbouring states.  Regionalization represented, as in Europe or North 
America, an opportunity to establish a more appropriate framework for 
absolving the pressures of multilateralism and globalization.  
 In Asia and Africa, regionalization is associated with the trade and 
investment strategies of private agents who operate in the absence of, or, as 
in Africa, in opposition to, institutionalized regional structures. The specific 
nature of the regionalization process in Africa results from this ambivalent 
relationship between regionalization, as impulses by private agents, and 
institutionalized patterns of regionalization - a distinction which recoups that 
between de jure and de facto regionalism (MacGaffey, 1991).  
There have been many attempts at regional integration. The most, probably, 
known instance is the European Union (EU), which in some issues has grown 
beyond an intergovernmental approach to decision making at a supra-state 
level, and in the recent time New Partnership for African development 
(NEPAD) in the African context. 
The objective of this research therefore is to place African regional 
integration organizations in security context, and to critically identify their 
perceived place in conflict management endeavours. 
Assessment of Regional Integration 
There  is no  sub-regional  integration process under  way  at 
this time Sub-regional groupings  in Africa… have not  been  
able to make  their  impact  felt. Where they have had an 
impact, it has been on balance negative.  As a result, member 
states are providing   support to agencies that make no 
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significant contribution in terms of improving Africa’s 
situation (ECA, 1990:6). 
African states all belong to the most ambitious and successful collective 
security   arrangement ever conceived- the UN. They also  belong to the 
African Union (AU)  formerly  OAU which since  the  Cairo declaration of 
1993 may  be regarded as a regional collective security  arrangement  under  
chapter viii of the UN charter. A number  of geographically  proximate 
Africa states  have also entered  into  collective  defence  agreements -  such 
as the treaty  of  Non Aggression, Assistance and Mutual  Defence; known 
by its French acronym – ANAD. In Europe, although often misperceived as a 
regional organization, NATO is a multinational alliance for collective self 
defence, as was the War-Saw Pact. A defensive alliance, according to art. 51  
of the  UN  charter,  may use  force  in self defence  without  waiting for the  
Security Council (SC) to take action, (only  in response  to an armed attack). 
Contrary, Art 53 (1)  allows  a regional  organization to take  enforcement  
action  even if there was no prior armed  attack, but  with  the  SC 
authorization. Art  54 on the  other  hand  requires  that  the SC “shall  at all 
times be kept informed of activities undertaken or in  contemplation under 
regional arrangements or by  regional agencies  for the  maintenance of 
international  peace and security”. 
At its 37th Ordinary Session in Lusaka, in July 2001, the OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government adopted the New African Initiative; later 
coined the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, (NEPAD). This seeks 
to reconfigure the continent’s political and economic institutions in order to 
manage the forces of globalization and stop the continent from sinking 
further into anarchy. The African Union seeks to promote democratic 
principles, peace, security and stability, greater unity and solidarity between 
African countries and African peoples, and the acceleration of political and 
socio-economic integration. NEPAD envisaged a new kind of partnership 
with the North and various multilateral and multinational institutions. It 
appears  that the OAU has hitherto recognized  five main sub-regions in 
Africa, and prioritized  only  one corresponding organization for each area; 
the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the east,  the  
Economic  Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the  West, the 
Arab  Maghreb  Union  (known by its  French acronym  - UMA)  in the  
North,  the South Africa Development Community (SADC) in the South, and 
the Economic Community of Central  African States  (ECCAS) in the  
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Central  Africa sub-region.  ECOWAS appears to be the best known of these 
organizations, having gained a good measure of international recognition 
through its massive  peacekeeping efforts in Liberia  and Sierra  Leone. 
SADC is also fast gaining   a reputation for involvement in robust conflict 
management activities and IGAD has also begun to assert a role for itself in 
the resolution of sub-regional conflict. Indeed the OAU seems to have been 
relegated to a conflict management role as an intermediary between the U.N. 
with  its  higher  moral  authority for ensuring  international peace  and  
security on the  one  hand, and the sub-regional organizations with  their  
perceived  greater political  will  and power on the other hand.  
However, without the courtesy and formality of a prior rigorous assessment 
of the progress already made, the African Heads of State in 1999, decided to 
establish the African Union. More specifically, Point 8 of the Sirte (Libya) 
Declaration called for the stepping up of the implementation process of the 
Abuja Treaty through the reduction of the original time frame of 34 years. It 
also called for the immediate establishment of all institutions provided for 
under the Treaty. The institutions in question are the African Central Bank, 
the African Monetary Fund, the Court of Justice, and the Pan-African 
Parliament.  
If almost all the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are still standing 
on very shaky ground, it is difficult to see how the previous, already 
unrealistic, time frame could be shortened. The political exigencies of the 
Sirte Declaration reflect no lessons from history. What is even more 
troubling is the fact that the intractable political and economic problems that 
were encountered while establishing sub-regional cooperation and integration 
arrangements in Africa in the last four decades have been simply assumed 
away (Mulat 1998a: 119 and Aly 1994:94-95).  
There are absolutely no shortcuts to an African Economic Community (AEC) 
or to African political union. In short, the move toward building and 
consolidating a continental community through sub-regional communities is 
neither as easy nor as straightforward as it may look. 
Although the process of integration in Africa would appear complex and 
intractable, the difficulties involved are not insurmountable. Nor should they 
discourage ongoing reforms and progress toward cooperation and Integration. 
The existence of many integration organizations, in itself, be perceived as 
constituting an impossible impediment to reforms. They can all contribute 
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negatively, in various ways, to the implementation effort of the AEC Treaty, 
if carefully thought-out harmonization and coordination policies are not 
undertaken along the way.  
To proponents of integration, essential prerequisite would be for states to 
surrender a certain degree of national sovereignty to elected supra-national 
bodies. Sovereignty is likely to be one of the persistent areas of discontent. 
As noted, African states have, hitherto retained total sovereign control of 
their territories and all aspects of decision-making, and have demonstrated a 
remarkable zeal not to cede any part of this authority for the common good of 
the continent. The Abuja Treaty calls on member-states to relinquish some of 
their powers to the Union. This implies a willingness to sacrifice some 
control over national economic policy management that directly affects the 
populations of member nations. Indeed, this is the basic litmus test for 
genuine political will and commitment to any regional integration effort. The 
Constitutive Act remains ambiguous on this very vital issue. On the one 
hand, it seeks to defend the national sovereignty of member-states, while on 
the other; it seeks to appropriate the right to intervene in the internal affairs 
of member-nations. This contradiction, if not properly handled, is likely to 
haunt future integration efforts in Africa.  
In many integration attempts in Africa, political leaderships have jealously 
guarded their sovereignty and were not willing to surrender any of it to supra-
national powers. As a result, national political agents tended to determine the 
nature of their participation in the integration project. The transfer of some 
powers will not only provide sub-regional secretariats with the necessary 
legitimacy but, most importantly, will vest in these institutions the necessary 
authority to make tough policy decisions and to enforce coordinated action in 
critical areas of national policy management. These shifts in decision-making 
do not necessarily imply erosion of existing state power and authority. 
Rather, what will have changed is the way in which states use their power 
and authority; decision-making will be made in coordination with other 
member- states. Moreover, the transfer of authority to elected supra-national 
bodies will enhance their ability to plan, coordinate, oversee and evaluate the 
implementation of collective projects and programs. Thus, sovereignty need 
no longer be thought of as a zero-sum game. Pooling it does not reduce 
sovereignty. Rather, the trade-offs of pooling sovereignty include security 
and stability, reduced anxiety and conflict, reduced military spending, and 
enhanced economic and technological cooperation (Rugumamu, 1999). In 
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short, the imperative of political will would constitute another important test 
of commitment to an integration project. This means that strong institutions 
at the national level would be indispensable for implementing this 
increasingly diverse policy and project initiatives for integration 
arrangements. 
Theoretical Analysis 
Most successful regional cooperation and collective security initiatives have 
thrived on the strong and willing leadership that Keohane (1980) and 
Kindleberger (1981) describe as ‘the theory of hegemonic stability’. 
Hegemony is a condition of dominance without necessarily resorting to 
coercion, due to the dependence of the subordinate actors in the sub-system 
on the fortunes of the hegemon. A hegemon is functionally necessary to 
institute and provide ‘international collective goods’ that make the 
international system work better. The Dutch were hegemonic in the European 
world economy of the 17th century. The British rose to hegemony in the 19th 
century, and the United States and the former Soviet Union emerged as the 
economic and military powers of the 20th century in the Western and Eastern 
blocs.  
In practical terms, equity among sovereign powers have always been a 
convenient international relations fiction. It has never been backed by reality 
because some powers have always been more dominant than others and, 
therefore, have been explicitly or implicitly charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing the agreed-upon norms of international behavior. 
The theory posits that the hegemonic power facilitates international 
cooperation and prevents defection from the rules of the regime through the 
use of sanctions, but can seldom, if ever, coerce reluctant states to obey the 
rules, norms and regulations of the regime. The presence of a regional 
hegemon serves as a positive force for developing, nurturing, as well as for 
building a regional peace and security system. To lead, other member 
countries in the region would have to accept such a benign hegemony and put 
sufficient effort into regionalization activities to gradually increase their own 
power and influence. Also, benevolent leaders are expected to assume a 
disproportionate cost burden for the integration project as well as to serve as 
the paragons of compliance with the regime’s rules, norms and procedures. It 
is not unusual in integration schemes to tax the wealthier member-states in 
order to aid the less developed. The hegemonic leader’s economic strength 
and political stability, for example, would bolster the region’s economic 
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vitality and political stability. It should also champion the cause of 
cooperation and integration by pulling the less willing and the less able 
countries along, as it may not be possible for all countries to move at the 
same time and pace (Keohane, 1980).  
Thus, the role of the United States in NAFTA, the emerging role of Germany 
in the European Union, the Nigerian strategic role in the activities of 
ECOMOG in West Africa, and that of the Republic of South Africa in the 
Southern African Customs Union are excellent contemporary examples of 
hegemonic stability. According to Olson “thus the world works better when 
there is a hegemonic power – one that finds it in its own interest to see that 
various international collective goods are provided” (1985: 122-127). Indeed, 
effective international regimes tend to rest on a political and economic base 
established through a strong and effective leadership that can persuade, 
induce or force other countries to cooperate. 
While democratic and politically stable South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and, 
possibly, Kenya have the capacity to play this strategic role in their 
respective sub-regions, the dominant position should be utilized in a 
constructive and benevolent way that is guided by a long-term perspective, 
rather than short-sighted national self-interests. By almost every measure, 
South Africa is the undisputable economic and military power in the 
Southern African sub-region; Zimbabwe comes in a distance second, and 
may remain so for the foreseeable future (Africa Confidential, 1995:7); as 
with the question of economic might, so with issues related to military 
superiority. The Republic of South Africa has no challenger in the region. It 
enjoys a marked supremacy on almost all counts. 
At least at the level of rhetoric, the present African National Congress 
government of South Africa has committed itself to linking its country’s 
future to the future of the region as a whole. Also the role of Nigeria cannot 
be underplayed or ignored if one is to understand regionalization processes in 
West Africa. The economic and resource dominance of Nigeria is important 
in understanding the political economy of West Africa. It is by far the most 
populous country in Africa. Its industrial and military sectors are by far the 
largest and the most diversified. In terms of regional security, Nigeria has 
played an unparalleled role in finding solutions to internal conflicts in 
countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria has frequently sought to 
shape the region in order to suit its interests, but France and its Francophone 
allies have often counteracted it indirectly. However, with the end of the 
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Cold War and a gradual withdrawal of France from Africa, Nigeria, is likely 
to play a more decisive hegemonic role in its region, just as South Africa is 
doing. Egypt and Kenya display similar superiority in their respective sub-
regions.  
The AU should consider aggressively promoting the role of the leaders in its 
sub-regions. However in the absence of substantive sub-regional hegemons 
or a strong collective leadership at the center, sub-regional organizations, and 
even individual African states, have not hesitated to by-pass the rigorous and 
often indecisive OAU (AU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution in order to restore peace in neighboring 
countries. The 1990s witnessed several peace-enhancing initiatives, including 
uninvited interventions by some African states in neighboring countries in 
order to restore constitutional government, end threats to peace, or achieve 
peace enforcement. These are a clear testimony to the AU’s institutional 
incapacity.  Moreover, in the absence of a strong decision-making organ at 
the center, the OAU remained virtually powerless to intervene in relatively 
bigger countries, such as Angola, Sudan and the DRC.  
In fact, for a long time, the former OAU failed to articulate credible plans for 
conflict management in these three conflict-ridden countries. The principal 
reasons for its incapacity to act were lack of resources, political will and 
resolute leadership.  Other factors responsible for the failure of most previous 
integration schemes in Africa lie in both the scarcity of resources to finance 
projects and integration programs and over-dependence on financial support 
from the donor nation. At the same time, member-states were not always in a 
position to honor their obligations, given their fragile financial positions and 
to some extent, their political will.  
However the proponent of regional integration holds that this would not only 
create economic benefits for member countries, but would also serve as a 
credible instrument for enhancing peace and security in the region by 
multiplying points of interaction among people and groups with similar 
interests (Rugumamu, 1997:283). 
A Critque 
At the same time, especially on a regional level, we must 
beware of statism. Many regional organizations, especially 
those involve in security, have contributed more to regime 
security than to the security of the people of the region. The 
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multiplier effect that one is looking for regional integration, 
can serve to entrench unpopular and undemocratic regimes 
who can rely on each other, and each other’s militaries for 
support (Ayoob, 1996: 61-65). 
Despite the prophets of globalization, states have remained the principle 
actors in the international arena, especially when it comes to the raising and 
employment of military forces. Where  individual  national  armies  have had 
the  capacity  and will to intervene  in African crises, it has  been  in pursuit 
of the real or perceived narrow national interests of the intervening country. 
Intervening in contemporary  African conflicts is a risky enterprise, in which  
states are  unlikely to take  part unless   they have  strong   interests  of  their 
own  to secure  (Corum,  1995:141). In many of this crisis, however, it is the 
very   nature of the state that is often at the centre of violent internecine 
conflicts.  
The crucial condition for state viability lies in the ability of the state to 
provide security to all its citizens on an  equitable basis. In functional 
political systems, the coercive monopoly of the state is used to provide 
protection to all citizens as a basic right. Security, inform of physical 
protection is provided for each citizen against every other, against the 
arbitrary actions of the state, and against threats from   beyond state borders. 
The failure of the state to provide such protection gives rise to a security 
dilemma. This condition becomes apparent when intermingled or adjacent 
groups of people start to sense that they have   to take care of their own 
security. The dilemma emerges, when what one does to enhance ones 
security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secured when 
groups perceive the state to be incapable or willing to provide security, they 
will take their own measure for protection. In the process, security becomes 
privatized or communalized (Posen, 1993:28 and Toit, 1998).   
Such security, however, further undermines the viability of the state by 
causing a spiral of destablishing counter   measures. This  creates  the  
incentive  to seek  security  through pre-emptive actions, and can lead to state 
collapse or disintegration  once a  crucial  threshold of escalation  has  been  
breached. 
The crises of the post-war order led to the emergence of a new global 
political structure. This new global political structure made obsolete   the 
classical Westphalia concept of a system of sovereign states to conceptualize 
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world politics. The concept of sovereignty becomes weaken and the old legal 
definitions of an ultimate and fully autonomous power of a nation-state are 
no longer meaningful.  Sovereignty, which gain meaning as an affirmation of 
cultural identity, has lost meaning just as power over the economy. All 
regional  integration  projects during the cold  war period  were  built   on the  
Westphalia   state  system and were to serve  economic growth  as well as  
security  motives in their assistance  to state  building goals.  
Regional integration and globalization are the two phenomena   challenging 
the existing   global order based upon sovereign states at the beginning of the 
21st century. The two  processes deeply  affect   the stability of the 
Westphalia  state system,  thus  contributing  to both  disorder  and  a new 
global  order. Since the demise of the cold war, African states   have become 
evermore vulnerable to armed insurgencies, and the success of such   
movements indicates the decline of these states as units of security.  This 
clearly indicates that we are busy trying to build hollow structures for 
conflict resolution in Africa- both at the A.U and at the sub-regional 
organizations. Our attempts to define  the relations between  the two are thus 
also  bound  to be fruitless,  unless we accept  the need to place state building  
and good   governance at the centre  of  such efforts, and strip the debate on 
the way forward  of its  customary politeness and  hypocrisy.  
The OAU and the  African  sub-regional organizations need to 
be clearer on the  moral  and political  principles which  
should inform the relationship between  an  within  states  in 
the region. These organizations should uphold  minimum  
standards, the violation of which  should  be  sanctioned  
equally across  the  board, and not   only when  the culprit  is 
a relatively less powerful  member of the organization (Vogt,  
1998). 
 The prospects for sub-regional collective  security or even  defence  regimes 
developing successfully  in  Africa  is not  considered to be good,  because  
states   remain the basic building blocks and decisional  loci of  multi national  
security regimes. The process of state formation and state building in Africa, 
on the whole, has not produced very strong base for larger security 
constructs.  
Many African states attain independence through low intensity conflict 
waged by liberation movements against colonial powers.  Having achieved 
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freedom in this manner, the  new states were  left highly  exposed  and 
vulnerable  to challenges  from within, bent  on using these very same 
methods against  them (Toit, 1998). However, African states   that have 
scarcely emerged from devastating civil wars are also now being expected to 
play an active role in conflict management through regional integration. Most 
African sub-regional organizations have been born of a need for economic 
cooperation, and have only recently been expected to play a role in security 
cooperation and conflict management.  This has resulted in a poor fit between 
roles and structures, as could be seen from the SADC inability to 
operationalise its organs for politics, defence and security. While this 
example  may  indicate that  there is  some  sense  in separating  economic  
issues from security concerns, the case of ANAD warns against too narrow a 
conceptualization of security,  and of  focusing almost exclusively on 
defence,  rather than  on several security issues.  
The type of conflicts caused by the political breakdown in African countries 
can rarely be remedied by short term military interventions. Rather, a system 
of phase and prioritized facilitating processes is needed for their 
management.  During the cold war, there was a fair understanding of a simple 
division of labour whereby the UN mounted military peace operations and 
observer missions while regional organizations concentrated on preventive 
political and diplomatic measures. This changed in the 1990s as a   
proliferation of devastating internal conflicts saw several actors becoming 
involved in attempts to resolve the same conflicts. Under the auspices of the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the OAU 
is   indeed authorized to work closely with the UN and with African regional 
and sub-regional organizations, and to co-operate where appropriate with 
neighbouring states.  
Thus, there is a perception that the future of conflict   management rests on a 
pyramidal security framework, which scholars have described as  
In graphic terms, and for the purpose of conflict management, 
the partnership between the UN and the AU, together with its 
corresponding sub-regional organizations,  should be  a kin  
to a pyramid. At the top of that pyramid should be the UN as a 
world body, and as the supreme organ for ensuring peace and 
security world wide. At the bottom of that pyramid should be 
the sub-regional organizations. And, between the apex and the   
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base, the AU should provide the critical linkage (Nhara, 
1998). 
While this approach to conflict management in Africa may appear logical as 
neighbours are more familiar with each other’s problems than outsiders, 
considering that neighbours usually share a fairly common culture, social 
identity, history, and experience. The major problem here is that close 
proximity often generates tension and reduces the spirit of impartiality  to the 
extent  that  they  sometimes become part of the problem, rather  than part  of 
the solution. However, the role of regional organizations in conflict 
management has become extremely convoluted. Conflict management has 
become more robust than ever before and new operations are increasingly 
launched. Drawing from the ECOMOG experience and perhaps, confused by 
NATOs unique resources as a defensive alliance without peer, these peace 
missions have been delegated to regional organizations and arrangements  
because-   
The UN does not have, at this point in its history, the 
institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement 
measures under chapter vii (of the UN charter). Under present 
conditions, ad hoc members state coalitions of the willing, 
offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the 
escalation or spread of an on going conflict... (Annan, 1997).  
This assertion reinforces the type of thinking that will perpetuate the trend 
towards using (sub) regional organizations as peace enforcers.  
One of the most vexing aspects of the regional security integration is the 
issue of states enjoying or being burdened by over lapping membership of a 
member of intergovernmental bodies that aspire to a role in conflict 
management.  For instance should the AU/UN not also recognize the EAC 
and ANAD as legitimate sub regional organizations for the management of 
conflict? This problem is not limited to Africa alone. Europe also has a 
highly complex regional security architecture that include the  UN,  
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO,  
Partnership for Peace  (PfP), the  West European Union (WEU), and the 
European Union (EU) and its various institutions (Malan, 1998).  The 
difference of course, is that the smallest and poorest   of these groups (PfP) 
can draw on the support of the industrialized states that are members of 
NATO and the EU. This adds to the viability of such arrangements. If all 
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regional organizations in Africa are comparatively poor, they are still 
political aspect of membership to be considered. The West African instance, 
where ECOWAS and  ANAD overlap, suggests that  membership of any 
regional security organization should err on the side  of  inclusiveness, rather  
than exclusivity, and that the membership  should be wider than  that of any  
over  lapping  regional economic grouping, otherwise  the economic 
grouping  will tend  to  take  the lead  in conflict  management   initiatives. 
Despite their diversity, it is safe to say that the sub regional organizations in 
Africa   including the big ones ECOWAS and SADC lack institutionalized 
crisis prevention and management mechanisms. Consequently,  regional  
military involvement  in conflict  management has  been  ad hoc  and not  in   
accordance with a specific  operating  procedure. A case study of the Liberian 
conflict reveals that the ECOWAS heads of state and government created a 
community standing mediation committee, which in turn established the 
ECOMOG. Contrary, in the Sierra Leone conflict, the committee of Heads of 
state and government did not formally approve of the ECOMOG force until 
about three months after its intervention. In a similar  situation, the  
ministerial   committee approved  ECOMOG mandate in  Guinea  Bissau,  at 
a  time  when  the  Heads  of state  and government committee  had  not   yet  
address the problem.  To crown it all, the stated objective of ECOWAS to 
crate a permanent peacekeeping force did not address the critical problem of 
who will determine when and how it will be deployed 
(http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link).  
In the SADC case, the great deficiency relates to the absence of conflict 
management structures, and of integrated systems, processes and methods 
with issues of human right and the advancement of democracy and good 
governance.  The latter is clearly a contentious issue, and one about which 
many of the fourteen SADC member nations are understandably very 
sensitive. While Swaziland is perceived to be undemocratic, Angola and the 
DRC are still engage in a war over who should rule. Zambia and Zimbabwe 
have been  accused  of being undemocratic in  election  related  practices, 
South  Africa  is seem to be drifting  towards a one  -party state and in 
Lesotho,  military intervention in politics  remain a real threat. The overall 
trend towards a transformation of the ambitious regional integration schemes 
into more modest functional cooperation programmes is a direct consequence 
of the member states reluctance to undertake transfers of sovereignty. The 
countries’ lack of political and financial internationalization of regional 
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integration commitments has been often denounced but should not be 
considered really surprising in a context where a good number of sates are 
confronted domestically with severe national integration problems. In broad 
terms, the desire for closer integration is usually related to a larger desire for 
opening to the outside world.  
Regional integration arrangements are mainly the outcome of necessity felt 
by nation-states to integrate their economies in order to achieve rapid 
economic development, decrease conflict, and build mutual trusts among 
members. But the nation-state system  which has been  the predominant  
pattern  of international relations  since  the  peace of  Westphalia in 1648 is 
evolving towards a system in which regional groupings of states are 
becoming more vital than the sovereignty of state. There is a perception that 
state and its sovereignty has become irrelevant by both local and global 
processes. The concept of sovereignty may likely become more blurred if the 
issue of regional integration is not properly addressed. 
Global peace and security is not divisible into geo-political regions, neither 
are the tools for ensuring and maintaining global peace and security. The 
international community needs to rethink its post cold war policies regarding 
the U.N policies that have given rise to an African peacekeeping architecture 
that is for all intends and purposes unsustainable. It should be noted that the 
African Standby Force Missions are at best stop gap measures and not inter-
locking alternatives to intervention by the UN. Therefore, we should seek to 
restrict, and not to enhance the roles of such security forces and agencies. 
Conclusion 
With a  number  of  Africa states   still  trying to  deal with the outcome of  
failed  nation hood,  and others consumed  by civil and secessionist  wars, 
regional  security  arrangements  need to focus on modest  measures for the 
prevention and  containment of conflicts, rather than  utopian ideas and 
complex institutional  mechanisms. 
The emphasis should be on simple but reliable structures for security 
cooperation. Ones that can stabilize relations, prevent the spill-over of 
conflicts, secure emerging common values and perhaps,  lay the foundation 
for  nascent security  regimes (Nhara,  1998: 38). Moreover, if this 
cooperation is to include joint military enforcement operations in support of 
peace processes, then this should be   determined up front, and the necessary 
legitimacy for such a course sought through the UN system. Regional 
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security   integration should rest on concepts of good governance, sound 
civil-military relations and commitments to democracy and human rights.  
As far as possible, potential security issues should be dealt with through 
political and social processes and institutions.  They should be elevated to the 
security agenda only when real threats become visible and special measures 
are required. At this point the possible role of defence institutions in dealing 
with such threats should be considered, but the implications of such 
employment need to be cautiously examined. Though proponents of intense 
regional integration  have advocated  for substantial and forceful missions  by 
Africans, this trend has been accepted rather uncritically by African  analyst, 
while  those from the North have  not had the courage  to openly  challenge 
African visions in the realm of improved  conflict  management  capabilities 
as long as such visions do not demand sacrifices of them. Thus  we have 
reached a stage where Africans are playing into the hands of those  who 
would  undermine the legitimacy  and efficacy  of the  UN  in  the field of 
peace  operations.  
This is obviously unintentional, for placing the UN at the apex of the 
pyramid reflects the respect that Africans have for the world body. Looking 
at the European experience, the OSCE has taken a comprehensive but 
realistic view of security, to include issues of arms control, preventive 
diplomacy, confidence building, human rights, and election monitoring. 
While WEU has the responsibility for European defence and security policy 
formulation, its priorities also lie in the area of conflict management and 
peacekeeping, rather than mutual defence. African sub-regional organizations 
may do well to take their lead from the OSCE and indeed the AU to accept 
the need to focus on the non-military components of security cooperation, 
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